Sin lugar a dudas hoy en día tener cash es un quebradero de cabeza, incluso para uno de los bancos Centrales más ricos del mundo y con mayor reserva de divisas. Precisamente las reservas de divisas, pueden poner en jaque al Banco Central Chino que acumula cerca de 3 billones en moneda extranjera, incrementando sus reservas cerca de un 24% respecto al año anterior.
Para hacernos una idea de la cifra indicar que el segundo país con mayor número de reservas en moneda extranjera es Japón con cerca de 1,1 billones.
Conocido como el banco de Pueblo, el poderoso Banco Central Chino se enfrenta a un grave problema, es más posiblemente en estos momentos ya sea insolvente y necesite una recapitalización. Su problema precisamente son los miles de millones en dólares, yenes y euros que acumula que no paran de depreciarse.
El Banco Central China se dedica a comprar las divisas que entran en el país y para ello el Banco Central financia estas compras en renminbi. Así que ya os podéis imaginar que pasa, activo que se deprecian financiados con una moneda que se aprecia, el agujero patrimonial es inevitable y eso que la apreciación del renminbi respecto a dólar y las otras divisas está siendo muy paulatina y suave controlada por el gobierno Chino.
Adicionalmente tenemos un segundo efecto, El Banco Central Chino se está viendo obligado a subir los tipos de interés, lo que eleva el coste de su financiación para comprar moneda extranjera. Por contra los tipos de interés de las deudas gubernamentales emitidas en dólares, euros o yenes están bajo mínimos.
Obviamente la insolvencia del Banco Central Chino es más bien una insolvencia puramente técnica, aunque las pérdidas son bien reales, al estar implícitamente apoyado por el Gobierno Chino, y sobretodo como las deudas están denominadas en renminbis siempre tiene la capacidad de darle a la maquinita de imprimir dinero para cumplir con sus obligaciones.
Dicho esto, el ejemplo de la situación del Banco Central Chino nos sirve de ejemplo para introducir una consideración importante. Oficialmente la deuda del gobierno Chino es del 17% sobre el PIB. Sin embargo si se tiene en cuenta las deudas “ocultas” de determinados vehículos financieros controlados por el Gobierno Chino esta asciende al 160% del PIB.
En fin, tiempos difíciles incluso para los países que nadan en la abundancia. Incluso los Chinos tienen sus problemas.
Yet there are two practical consequences to the weakened financial condition of the central bank. First, someone has to bear the economic burden of its recapitalization, and that, as a practical matter, means China’s citizens.
Taking money out of their pockets, whether directly in the form of taxes or indirectly through low bank deposit rates, means they will have less disposable income. The less disposable income they have, the less they will be able to fuel domestic consumption. Just about everyone thinks the Chinese people must substantially increase their consumption to sustain the economy beyond the short-term.
Second, the liabilities of the Chinese central bank increase those of the Chinese central government. Beijing maintains that its sovereign obligations amounted to only 17% of its GDP at the end of last year, but China’s official numbers omit certain government debts and the so-called hidden liabilities, such as the debt of local government financing vehicles. Beijing, in reality, is carrying a heavy debt burden, perhaps as much as 160% of its GDP.
In any event, Fitch this month downgraded the outlook for China’s local-currency debt from “stable” to negative,” an indication of looming problems that have so far been masked by quick growth. To create quick growth, Beijing in late 2008 forced its banks to lower prudential standards and go on an extraordinary lending spree. Now that the pace of lending has slowed to minimize the resulting inflation, we are hearing concerns about the solvency of the banks. China’s official nonperforming loan ratio for end 2010 is 1.14%, but that number does not reflect trillions of yuan of questionable loans.
As a practical matter, Beijing has to stand behind the four largest state banks—Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China—so these institutions will, one way or another, find ways to honor their obligations. Even smaller banking institutions benefit from an informal government guarantee.
The problem for the Chinese central government is that it must support both weakened commercial institutions and insolvent government instrumentalities at a time when it must slow the economy to stem inflation. Yet Beijing’s technocrats are finding it difficult to exercise the one effective tool for this purpose—interest rate increases—because such increases undermine, among other things, the central bank’s solvency. Although there have been four recent rate hikes, they have all been small and obviously ineffective in reining in prices.
Once, China was in a virtuous economic cycle. Yet the likely insolvency of the PBOC points to a critical flaw in the state-dominated economy: its trends are mostly self-reinforcing. Self-reinforcing trends are great when the economic cycle is in the up phase; they are disastrous on the inevitable downturn.
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